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Abstract 
Analysing the newly emerged Trianon-cult this paper argues that the current wave of memory-politics 
became the engine of new forms of nationalism in Hungary constituted by extremist and moderate 
right wing civic and political actors. Following social anthropologists Gingrich and Banks the term 
neo-nationalism will be applied and linked with the concept mythomotoeur’ of John Armstrong and 
Anthony D. Smith emphasizing the role of pre-existing ethno-symbolic resources or mythomoteurs 
in the resurgence of nationalism. A special attention will be given to elites who play a major role in 
constructing new discourses of the nation and seek to control collective memories, taking their diverse 
intentions, agendas and strategies specifically into consideration. This “view from above” will be 
complemented with a “view from bellow” by investigating the meanings that audiences give to and 
the uses they make of these memories. Thus, the analysis has three dimensions: it starts with the 
analysis of symbols, topics and arguments applied by public Trianon discourses; it continues with the 
analysis of everyday perceptions, memory and identity concerns; and finally ends with an 
anthropological interpretation of memory-politics regarding a new form of nationalism arising in the 
context of propelling and mainstreaming populist right-wing politics. The main argument of the paper 
is that the Hungarian Trianon-cult identified as national mythomoteur although invokes a historical 
trauma but rather speaks to current feelings of loss and disenfranchisement, offering symbolic 
compensation through the transference of historical glory, pride, and self-esteem within a 
mythological framework. The paper is part of a larger effort to understand the cultural logic and social 
support of new forms of nationalism in Hungary propelled by the populist far right.  
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Introduction. Memory-politics and neo-nationalism 
Issues related to the past and its commemoration re-emerged as pressing concerns at the moment 
when the young Hungarian democracy began to exhibit serious signs of crisis. The signs of this 
renewed preoccupation with the past are manifold. They range from the overburdening of legal and 
political discourses with historical references, through the erection of hundreds of new statues all over 
the country, to the commemoration of historical events that were irrelevant or in some cases even 
unacknowledged. Nevertheless, this was not the first time that historical symbols acquired an 
importance in Hungary’s post-communist history. Historical revisionism and commemorative 
practices had contributed to the symbolic breakdown of the communist system (Gal, 1991; Hofer, 
1991; Hann, 1990; Zempléni, 2002; Verdery, 1999) and created new ways of legitimization in a 
situation where former mechanisms of legitimacy (…) have suddenly ceased to operate (Gyáni 1993: 
902-3). The “search for a usable past” supported mainly the revival of national myths, symbols and 
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narratives – of the “the memory-nation connection.” (Olick, 1998) However, as a case study analysing 
the 150 anniversaries of the revolutions in 1848 revealed, the concept of democracy and common 
European values were also symbolically legitimized – though with varying effects – through historical 
references to historical moments of pre-communist times. (Brubaker and Feischmidt, 2002) 
A specific relation to the past which anthropologists have exposed in recent years is the nostalgia of 
state socialism. Moreover, they claimed that as much the Holocaust becomes a paradigm for research 
in memory studies, works on nostalgia are paradigmatically East European (Todorova and Gille 2010, 
Ange and Berliner 2015) Furthermore a causal relationship between the nostalgia of socialism and 
rampant feelings of insecurity and disenfranchisement have been identified. In her path-breaking work 
on post-communist nostalgia, Daphne Berdahl conceptualized Ostalgie as a form of resistance. 
(Berdahl, 2010) 
This paper focuses on a newer wave of memory-politics– one that commemorates national trauma 
and defeat partially following the logic of ethnic mythologies of the immediate post-socialist period 
and partially fitting to the “fabric of nostalgia” anchored in collective feelings of loss of the last decade. 
Colovic and Zubrzycki have identified the power of symbolic actions and mythologies in resurgence 
of Serbian and Polish nationalism as well as in legitimizing radical political changes in these countries 
far before us. (Zubrzycki 2006, 2011; Colovic 2002) A similar fundamental political transformation 
has been legitimized more recently in Turkey by reinterpreting the founding moments of the Turkish 
nation and reshaping the public understanding of its history. (Cinar and Has, 2017) Similarly Chris 
Hann has proven (using the example of Ópusztaszer) how politicians manipulate the national past in 
Hungary to authenticate the political representation of a national grandeur. (Hann 2015) 
This paper argues that the current wave of memory-politics became the engine of new forms of 
nationalism in Hungary constituted by extremist and moderate right wing civic and political actors. 
Following social anthropologists Gingrich and Banks the term neo-nationalism will be applied, which 
emphasizes the re-emergence of nationalism in relation to far right populist politics and to symbolic 
strategies manipulating notions of national culture and history (Gingrich-Banks 2006: 6) Nevertheless, 
to understand the connection of memory politics to re-emergence of nationalism an old concept of 
nationalism studies will be applied: mythomotoeur or myth-symbol complex. The term was introduced 
by John Armstrong indicating the vital role of myths and symbols (Armstrong 1982) and further 
developed by Anthony Smith to mark the centrality and continuity of constitutive myths (Smith 1988). 
In a later book Smith emphasizes the role of pre-existing ethno-symbolic resources or mythomoteurs 
in the resurgence of nationalism (Smith 1999, 253). Following the late Anthony Smith and further 
constructivist scholars, I will pay special attention to elites who play a major role in constructing new 
discourses of the nation and seek to represent collective memories, taking their diverse intentions, 
agendas and strategies specifically into consideration. (Fox, 2014; Smith, 2014) This “view from 
above” will be complemented with a “view from bellow” by investigating the meanings that audiences 
give to and the uses they make of these memories.  
Chris Hann recently analysed the recovery of the national mythomoteur in the context of a particular 
Hungarian village. My theoretical ambition is similar, though with a somewhat different methodology. 
Instead of focusing on one locality, I will concentrate on a single issue of memory politics: the re-
emergence of the discourse on “national trauma” in relation to the Trianon Treaty and the historical 
nostalgia related to the pre-Trianon “golden age” of the nation that is symbolized as “Greater 
Hungary.” Although I consider the investigations pursued by critical historiographers relevant to this 
analysis, my approach differs also from theirs. A social anthropological perspective will be applied by 
focusing on objects of memory politics (commemorative events, historical myths and symbols) as well 
as its agents. Everyday discourses will be also examined taking in consideration structural abilities of 
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the post-communist, neo-capitalist context. Moreover the problem of how memory-politics propels 
new forms of nationalism as well as its impact on national identity will be also addressed.  
Finally, there is an effort to analyse the Hungarian case in a comparative framework by showing how 
a semi-peripheral capitalism characterized by a shortage of other resources seeks to create symbolic 
capital through the manipulation of the past and the production of its mythic visions. The paper's 
second section will provide a short overview of the discursive field wherein divergent representations 
of Trianon are produced. This overview will be followed by four subsequent sections that deal with 
different actors who are involved in recovery of the Trianon mythomotoeur. I begin by briefly 
addressing the memory-politics of the state (section three) and academic discourses (section four), 
before devoting attention to discourses of public history (section five) and far-right politics (section 
six). My main argument is that various far-right organizations decisively shaped the Trianon-discourse 
and used it as a tool to subvert the basic political consensus and taboos of the post-communist period. 
While the intentions of these groups have thus far prevailed, there also other actors who seek to offer 
a less radical interpretation and move the symbol towards the political mainstream by focusing 
attention on the present-day dispersion of the Hungarians and calling for an ethnic perception of the 
nation. The last part of the paper will analyze various semi-public discourses of everyday actors. Based 
on this data a neo-Durkheimian explanation of historical nostalgia is adopted which says that the 
Trianon-cult although invokes a historical trauma but rather speaks to current feelings of loss and 
disenfranchisement, offering symbolic compensation through the transference of historical glory, 
pride, and self-esteem within a mythological framework.  
 
Memory-politics in Hungary. Strategies and agencies of the Trianon-discourse  
Hungary lost large territories (along with two-third of its population) after the First World War. The 
Trianon Treaty (signed in 1920) left a long-lasting impact on historical consciousness as well as 
national identity. This is evident from the oft-cited phrase “Magyar az, akinek fáj Trianon” (A Hungarian 
is someone who grieves Trianon), which also highlights the emotional charge carried by the historical 
trauma.  
Hungarian scholars identified two antagonistic strategies that political elites have later adopted in 
relation to Trianon. They claim that elites have alternated between an effort to maintain the topic “on 
the agenda” (interwar period) and an attempt to “silence” the issue (communist period). However, 
According to Vásárhelyi, the regime change brought about a novel situation in that the two strategies 
were simultaneously present in the Hungarian public sphere after 1989 (Vásárhelyi, 2007). Historian 
Gergely Romsics (2006: 50) came to a similar conclusion. Analyzing parliamentary speeches between 
1990 and 2002, he concluded that there is a clear distinction between the right-wing rhetoric (which 
emphasizes historical grievances from an ethnic and/or historical point of view) and the left-liberal 
discourse (which focuses on the topic's negative impact on society). 
I myself have come to think of Trianon discourses in a slightly more complex way. One discursive 
strategy is the detachment from the emotional aspects of the historical event which is related either to 
a past-oriented approach (its proponents emphasize the historical causes of the territorial division); or 
to a more present-oriented approach which denies nostalgia by a pragmatic acceptance of territorial 
division. The other discursive strategy consists in elevating the Trianon-discourse into the emotive 
and symbolic domain with a view to evading a clash with pragmatic pressures. This strategy can also 
be related with a past- or a present-oriented approach. The former strives to recover the national unity 
through a re-enactment of a mythical past. The latter seeks to displace the loss and grief caused by 
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Trianon by portraying ethnic Hungarians who became citizens of neighboring countries as suffering 
victims and to overcome the separation by enacting rituals of reunification.  
These approaches tend to be followed by different types of actors (although it is not possible to neatly 
match approaches with actors). I will begin my analysis with the Hungarian state, which has vacillated 
between embracing and denying the Trianon-trauma before settling for an in-between position after 
1989. However, the state has recently shifted strategy when the new right-wing government led by the 
Fidesz party officially embraced the Trianon-trauma after 2010. Academics were critical of such 
attempts due to the emotional detachment that characterizes scholarly practice. The majority of 
historians, however, also admit that they have adopted a special position in relation to Trianon. This 
has to do with the fact that the influence exercised by other actors renders an objectivist stance very 
hard to sustain. One such category of actors that I will analyze is constituted by the agents of public 
history who exert significant influence through the maintenance of memorial houses, the publication 
of historical magazines and the building of a nostalgia-industry. These actors are, however, not alone 
on the turf of myth-building. The civic and political organizations situated on the far-right end of the 
ideological spectrum were the first to initiate public events on the Trianon-topic and these actors 
continued to dominate commemorative activities by recent times when the nationalist government 
has appropriated it successfully. In what follows, I will analyze the symbolic work performed by each 
of these actors and also seek to show how their strategies and achievements influenced each other. 
 
Mainstreaming Trianon: the Hungarian state celebrating the extraterritorial nation   
Without doubt the most significant recent change in the public memory of Trianon is a remarkable 
shift in the discourse of the Hungarian state. This is part of a more general shift in the direction of 
identity politics. This shift is most clearly visible in the new Fundamental Law whose Preamble 
identifies national values and traditions as the foundations of the political community. Here, I would 
like to emphasize the new law, whereby “the National Assembly declare[d] the 4th of June, the day of the 
enforced Peace Treaty of Trianon of 1920, a Day of National Cohesion.” (Act No. 45 of 2010)  
The preamble of the Law on the Testimony for National Cohesioni calls the “Peace Treaty signed on the 
4th of June, 1920 … one of the greatest tragedies of Hungarian history” and emphasizes the “political, economic, 
legal, and psychological problems [that] remain unresolved to this day.” The second section of the law takes a 
stance both against revisionist politics (pursued by the far-right) and universalism (pursued by the left-
liberal elite). The third section asserts the existence of a “single Hungarian nation” and states that the 
unity of Hungarian individuals and communities should be based on “crossborder cohesion.” The 
fourth section attempts to connect regret for lost territorial integrity with historical self-criticism and 
declares a “national commitment” towards the minority communities living outside the current 
territory of the state: “The Hungarian National Assembly feels obliged to call upon present members of the 
Hungarian nation and those of future generations to strive for national cohesion (…).” 
In the speech he gave at the first official commemoration of the Memorial Day for the Treaty of 
Trianon, former president László Sólyom emphasized the event's decisive influence on Hungarian 
national identity, Hungary’s relationship with crossborder Hungarian minority communities and 
various peoples living in neighbouring countries. He pointed out that the significance of the 
commemoration resides in its effort to nurture a sense of unity: “The Hungarian nation exists through the 
cultural nation in Hungary, the mother country, through the autochthonous Hungarian communities in the neighbouring 
countries, and through the Hungarian diaspora throughout the world. Hungary on the other hand is also a multinational 
country that recognizes its national and ethnic minorities as being constituent parts of the state. Our position thus comes 
with numerous responsibilities. As we now declare our unity, it is paramount to identify the present-day genuine structure 
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of our nation, the pending tasks of the mother country, and the various needs of the minority communities abroad. 
However, having the knowledge and the will-power is not sufficient. We also need to resolve the emotive dimension in the 
two-fold task of upholding our national unity and improving our relation with neighbouring peoples. In this, too, we need 
to seek for a new path.”ii  
The text of the law and the presidential speech mirror a clear tendency to promote a Hungarian 
national identity defined by historical traditions and ethno-linguistic commonality as opposed to a 
citizenship-based national community. In this sense, the celebration of National Cohesion constitutes 
a foundational event, which— through its yearly commemoration—reinforces the legitimacy of the 
concept of ethnic citizenship. It is important to note that this concept was later codified into law 
through the reform of the citizenship lawiii. These two legal texts, together with the choreography of 
the official commemoration of Trianon, have cast a shadow over the existing geo-political status quo 
in the Carpathian Basin. 
The ambiguity of the historical legacy and of the nation's ethnicization have continued to characterize 
the memory-politics of the right-wing government in the past years. The self-reflexive tone – 
introduced by László Sóyom – has, however, all but disappeared. The same has happened with a later 
endeavour: that of incorporating professional discourses into the state’s memory-politics. This is, for 
instance, evidenced by a permanent exhibition entitled “We, the Hungarians” (Mi, magyarok) 
inaugurated in 2015 but closed two years later without any explanation. The exhibition was hosted by 
The House of Hungarianness (Magyarság Háza), iv a public institution devoted to supporting the 
development of “Hungarian-Hungarian relations” and the promotion of “national values”. v The 
exhibition strived to transcend the tragic view of the nation by emphasizing past achievements and 
linking them to the challenges of the present. Combining new perspectives with new technologies and 
an emphasis on everyday life, the exhibition was achieving a high degree of interactivityvi.  
As mentioned before, the current conservative government has appropriated the historical legacy of 
Trianon. This still true, though there are clear evidences that memory politics and historical nostalgia 
became less important in public discourses on the nation than the discourses on enemies made topical 
with references to the threat of migration since 2015. The nationalisation of the public memory of 
Trianon has been achieved by a historical narrative focused on national pride anchored in the pre-
Trianon period and by promoting the ethnic bond unifying Hungarians living in and outside the 
current borders of the country. In the latter case, ethnic unity is evoked through the celebration of 
various historical symbols that were invented by late nineteen century romantic nationalists. The 
mythic bird, the Turul, is one of the key symbols of this ethnic mythology. In a speech he gave at the 
Ópusztaszer memorial, prime minister Orbán alluded to the bird's role in the healing of the Trianon-
trauma. “It [the Turul] reminds us that every Hungarian is responsible for every other Hungarian. The Hungarian 
nation is a world nation because the boundaries of the country do not coincide with those of the nation… This statue tell 
us that there is only one country, which is capable of uniting all Hungarians on both sides of the Trianon border into a 
single community. (Hann, 2015: 141vii) “The future which overwrites Trianon has started” is the title of a 
commemorative article published on the website of Kurultaj, “the annual assembly of the Hun-Turkic 
nations”,viii an event inspired by the interwar idea of Turanism celebrating the Eastern ancestry and 
kinship of the Hungarians. Seen from the perspective of the unity of “Turanic” nations celebrated in 
Ópusztaszer and Bugac the home country from where the Hungarians join this unity and aspires to be 
its leader is not Hungary as a political unit but the “Carpathian-basin” as a naturalized ethnic unit.ix  
This section has addressed the radical shift of state politics towards issues of memory, emphasizing 
how Trianon was used to legitimize the ethnic reconceptualization of the nation. I highlighted two 
divergent ways of representing the nation: through the symbols of ethnic mythology (exemplified by 
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the prime-minister’s reference to the Turul) and through the link to modernity (exemplified by the 
fugitive exhibition “We, the Hungarians” and the speech of the former state president) claiming the 
clear prioritization of the former in the last years. The next section will address the intellectual sources 
of the historical discourse.  
 
Divergent academic approaches to the “Trianon-trauma” 
Trianon was always in the focus of Hungarian historiography and this very intense academic interest 
generated manifold controversies and debates. Historian Ignác Romsics gives a short outline of 
dominant historiographic perspectives on Trianon during three important periods of the twentieth 
century: the Horthy-period, the coalition period (1945–1947), and the Kádár-period. He shows that 
the revisionist politics of the Horthy-regime were supported by two types of argumentation: a 
historical narrative promoting the cultural and political superiority of Hungarians and a discourse 
which combined ethnic and geographic notions in order to present “the Central-Danube Basin” as a 
unitary region from a geopolitical and economic point of view (Romsics, 2010: 8–9). The coalition 
period was characterized by the dominance of a critical perspective, which addressed the negative 
consequences of the revisionist era. In the first decades of state-socialism the goal of “reckoning with 
our own revisionists and chauvinists” over-ruled all other interpretative attempts. Perspectives 
emphasizing the need for a release from the trauma caused by wartime losses - together with the 
assumption of responsibility for crossborder Hungarian minorities - only returned into Hungarian 
politics and public discourse in the 1970s. Most of the historians working on this topic agree that the 
present-day engagement with Trianon is motivated by the actual trauma which was preserved in social 
memory and forms an integral part of national identity. Scholars have also highlighted that the symbol 
has become connected to the cause of Hungarian minority communities and stressed that historians 
cannot disregard this relationship. 
Not all scholars agree with this interpretation. Refuting the 'continuity thesis’, sociologist and historian 
Éva Kovács has articulated a radically different interpretation for the survival of the trauma: “One can 
easily see, that for long time now, the memory of Trianon has not been fueled by our first-hand experience nor been part 
of our communicative memory. There is almost no one left to remember Trianon personally. What we know today about 
Trianon comes from cultural memory. Trianon has become a lieu de mémoire (Pierre Nora) and a part of memory 
politics. As a consequence, the various uses of Trianon belong to an ideology which appropriates historical debates to be 
instrumentalized in the service of politics, giving a new shape to existing attitudes. Unfortunately, in our case these 
attitudes do not enhance a disposition towards patriotism, but intensify the feelings of xenophobia, revanche, and 
ressentiment which can be found more or less in all societies.” (Kovács, 2010: 50) 
Kovács's argument is that the popular public history discourse on Trianon – which she calls 
“Trianonizing”– serves as an instrument for clouding or side-lining the unsettling memory of the 
Holocaust. Gábor Gyáni agrees with Éva Kovács regarding the close connection between the 
persistent significance of the Trianon-cult and the unsettling memory of the Holocaust. He, however, 
proposes an alternative explanation for the popularity of Trianon: “there is no other historical referent in 
Hungarian history [aside Trianon], which could assume the function of the quintessential Hungarian lieu de mémoire.” 
(Gyáni, 2012, translation mine).  
An outstanding achievement in the creation of lieux de memoire is the volume edited by the historian 
Miklós Zeidler and published in 2003 as the second tome of the Nation and Memory series. This volume 
contains the most comprehensive collection of historical sources about the First World War, including 
documents of the Peace Conference and Peace Treaty in Paris, as well as material on the revisionist 
politics that prepared the field for the Treaties of Vienna (1938 and 1940). The second part of this 
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monumental work deals with the political and public memory of Trianon in the interwar period and 
after the Second World War - covering the search for alternative political visions, essays written by 
public intellectuals, alongside documents from the popular culture of revisionism. The volume also 
contains a separate chapter on “scientific memory” (covering the main issues and approaches of 
academic work dealing with Trianon) and some newer studies investigating the cultural memory of 
Trianon (Trianon in historical consciousness; Trianon as national trauma; Trianon in literature, 
Trianon legends, Trianon in popular culture).  Approaching to the 100 anniversary of the Peace 
Conference and Treaty in Paris the Hungarian Academy of Sciences launched a research program 
which according his leader, the historian Balázs Ablonczy x  promotes new research on social 
consequences of the Trianon Treaty affecting local societies and international relations in the region, 
as well as publication promoting transnational professional discourse. 
There is a close relationship between the memory of Trianon and Hungarian nationalism. Most of the 
above referred authors agree that Trianon is a lieu de memoire endowed with the potential of becoming 
a central political symbol. But when? – one could ask, taking inspiration from the classic question of 
nationalism studies (“When is the nation?”). In relation to the latest revival Zeidler reiterated the 
important link between the resurgence of “Trianonization” and nationalism as a political project: “In 
the midst of the heated public discussions that took place in the period of the political transition Trianon was once again 
resurrected as a public and political issue. Those who introduced the theme into public debates were representatives of the 
cultural and  political elite who characterized themselves as nationally minded or nationally committed. They identified 
as opponents those who sought to keep the topic within the framework of academic investigation in order to avoid the 
subjective and symbolic reapplication of Trianon. (Zeidler, 2003: 11) 
 
Public history: old mythology for a new nationalism 
While the academic community - represented by researchers working in the fields of political, 
intellectual, and social history (Ablonczy, 2010; Kovács, 2010 and 2011; Michela and Zahorán, 2010; 
Romsics 2010; Zeidler ed. 2003; Zeidler, 2002), as well as the sociology of knowledge (Gyáni 2010, 
2012) – has maintained a certain distance from the practice of memory-politics, other non-scientific 
and non-state-run institutions have sought to combine the disciplinary professionalism of history-
writing with the project of myth-building. The most important examples of this approach are: the 
Trianon Museum in Várpalota, the periodicals Nagy Magyarország [Greater Hungary] and Trianoni Szemle 
[Trianon Review], and popular musicians who place a strong emphasis on historical mythology in their 
work. Their common ambition is to insist on the recognition of the trauma that Trianon caused for 
Hungarian national identity and, more broadly, to devise a new type of memory-politics that affirms 
their understanding of national identity and the “national interest”. Their goal, in other words, is to 
link Hungarian national self-image to Trianon in a way as to undermine interpretations that shadow 
the issue. 
One of the main actors in the field of public history is the Trianon Research Institute, which publishes 
the Trianoni Szemle.xi The institute was founded in 2007 by Gyula Fábián, senior journalist at the right-
wing daily Magyar Nemzet, Ernő Raffay, professor of a church run university, Gyula Zeke, former 
cultural radio host and current advisor to the prime minister, and Archimédesz Szidiropulosz, the 
director of the Institute. The publication of the periodical was initially funded by the local government 
of Óbuda. Recent applications for state funding were, however, twice rejected by the National Cultural 
Fund and the relevant parliamentary committees. This prompted the editors to call on the readers of 
the daily Magyar Hírlap and the viewers of Echo TV to donate money to support the publication.xii 
Since 2013, no new issues have been published.  
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Archimédesz Szidiropulosz wrote a three volume monograph about Trianon. One of the volumes 
deals with “the perception of Trianon within Hungarian society,” through a collection of interviews 
with intellectuals, politicians, and public figures (Szidiropulosz 2005). His aim is to examine the 
relationship between Trianon and national identity and he reaches the conclusion that Hungarian 
national identity was so severely damaged by the Treaty that it never recovered from the trauma: “Since 
Trianon, we have always had to explain ourselves; we always get confused when we asked about our homeland, our 
national belonging. Our national identity has become unsettled and deformed after Trianon. The decades of communism 
have almost completely eliminated feelings of national belonging in Hungary, while all over the world the most natural 
feeling shared by people is their sense of national belonging.” (Szidiropulosz 2005, 398) Szidiropulosz states that 
the lack of consensus regarding the question of Trianon is caused by both generational and political 
factors. According to him, the main problem lies in the “neoliberal” and “global” ideology, which 
excluded the topic of Trianon from public and scholarly discussions, because their proponents 
“cannot relinquish the stereotype which holds that every argument about or emotional connection to 
Trianon represents an extreme position.” (Szidiropulosz 2005, 399)  
Far less embedded in professional scholarly networks, yet wanting to play an even more significant 
role in the shaping of memory-politics, is the Trianon Museum, which was inaugurated on 4 June, 
2004, in the Zichy Palace in Várpalota. The building belongs to the Trianon Museum Foundation 
whose advisory board was initially led by Zsolt Bayer (a founding member of Fidesz and the country's 
most renowned right-wing journalist). The permanent exhibitions of the Museum commemorate the 
heroism of Hungarian soldiers during the First and Second World Wars (The relics of Hungarian heroism 
and bravado); the revisionist movements of the Horthy-regime (About the history of the Hungarian revisionist 
movements); the national public monuments destroyed after 1918; the poets who sang “the pain of 
Trianon” and “the joy and enthusiasm” experienced during the short “return of the torn-away 
territories” after the First (1938) and Second (1940) Vienna Treaties. One of the permanent exhibitions 
in the Museum commemorates the revisionist movements of the interwar period (invoking many of 
the slogans of the time: “Hungary does not forget!”; “No revolt. But no compromise either.”; 
“Transylvania is ours.”; “Justice to Hungary!”; “What was once, shall be again.”), and the political acts 
of revision (the “return” in 1938 and 1940 of the territories lost as a result of the Treaty)—interpreting 
these as moments of national self-realization. 
While the left-liberal government that was in power between 2002 and 2010 did not take notice of the 
initiative, the new Fidesz government developed an ambivalent relationship with the institution. On 
the one hand, the Museum receives state funding (45 million Forints in 2011, 53 million in 2012). On 
the other hand, it was not designated as the official commemoration place of the Trianon Memorial 
Day. Nevertheless the Trianon Museum received overwhelmingly positive coverage in the right-wing 
media. For example, the that time mainstream right-wing daily Magyar Nemzet greeted the inauguration 
of the Museum with an enthusiastic tone: “Nearly fifteen years had to pass for the first Trianon Museum to 
open its doors in Rump Hungary.”xiii  
In this section I presented the popular forms of the memory-politics – ranging from the publication 
of semi-professional historical periodicals to the creation of historical memory sites (labelled as a 
“museum”) – that played an important role in the rehabilitation of the symbolic tool kit, which enabled 
Trianon to become the mythomoteur of Hungarian neo-nationalism. I argue that the proponents of 
professional historiography have been side-lined by the enterprise of myth-building in the service of 
an old-new identity politics. The main purpose of the Trianon-discourse was to transform the 
approach to national history, in other words, to construct a different kind of memory-politics. Having 
investigated the field of public history, I now turn to the political field to analyze how memory-politics 
can be bent to the service of the political will. This analysis will focus on two directions and 
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institutional actors within the right-wing political field: the Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement, 
which calls for a revisionist solution regarding the question of Trianon; and the Jobbik Youth 
Movement, which created new festivities focusing on the commemoration of Trianon on the local 
level with a view to promoting grass-roots mobilization.  
 
Trianon: a taboo-breaking symbol elaborated by the far-right 
The commemorations of Trianon were not initiated by the Hungarian state but various political and 
civil organizations, all of which belong to the far-right side of the ideological spectrum. The most 
remarkable commemorative events of the early 2000s were organized by a radical youth organization, 
the Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement (SFCYM). In the past few years, however, the local 
branches of the far right party, Jobbik have also organized Trianon commemorations in many of the 
towns and villages where the SFCYM has had no activity. As a consequence, the latter organization 
found itself compelled to increasingly radicalize its discourse with a view to maintaining a competitive 
edge over Jobbik-led Trianon-festivities, which have targeted families and youth. 
The SFCYM received its name from the “sixty-four counties which constituted Hungary before the 
Trianon Treaty,” according to the founders of the movement. It presents itself as “the only 
organization in the Carpathian Basin that does not recognize the borders drawn after Trianon.” As 
the program of SFCYM states, the goal of the movement is to achieve the revision of the Treaty and 
the establishment of territorial autonomies. Despite its clear political goals, the organization puts a lot 
of emphasis on activities related to cultural events, humanitarian action, and “nationally-oriented” 
education. The movement, under the charismatic leadership of László Toroczkai, played a leading role 
in the creation of two popular musical and cultural events: the Magyar Sziget [Hungarian Island] and 
the Székely Sziget [Szekler Island] festivals. These initiatives relied on the dynamic 'national rock' scene 
as a resource and entrenched the organization as a significant actor on the far-right. (Feischmidt-Pulay 
2017)  
The SFCYM has forged close ties with Jobbik. During the campaign for the 2010 parliamentary 
elections, the two organizations signed a cooperation agreement (together with the Magyar Gárda 
[Hungarian Guard] and other organizations).. The strong collaboration with Jobbik became looser in 
the time preceding the 2018 elections, but did not prevent the SFCYM from maintaining a distinctive 
profile. It achieved this through the appropriation of certain themes and stylistic elements, successfully 
carving out its own unmistakable position on the far-right scene. It organized the first Trianon 
commemoration on 4 June, 2001, together with the then popular Hungarian Revisionist Movement 
lead by György Budaházy. In 2005, the SFCYM managed to mobilize a significantly larger crowd for 
the same commemoration, most likely thanks to the general shift in public opinion towards the right. 
In 2008, there were already several commemorations, but the SFCYM and Jobbik mobilized by far 
the largest crowd. The website of the organization featured a map which showed all the locations 
where commemorations were held simultaneously, mostly in collaboration with Jobbik's local 
chaptersxiv. The SFCYM focused on preparing the Budapest festivities.xv In the past years, Jobbik has 
spent additional effort on the installation of monuments in connection to Trianon commemorations.xvi 
These commemorations usually take place at the site of the local Trianon memorial—provided there 
is one. The installation of such monuments was sometimes realized with the help of the church or 
local government.  
The new generation of far right politicians (the so called Jobbik-generation), taking advantage of the 
popularity of local Trianon commemorations, used its newfound strength and legitimacy to challenge 
the silencing strategy pursued by left-liberal elites. It thereby established Trianon as a symbol on which 
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a novel kind of anti-establishment politics could be built. The official adaption of the symbol by the 
new right-wing government, and the subsequent political career of the Trianon-cult, attests to the 
mobilizational power of Trianon. While certain figures within the ruling party - such as Zsolt Bayer - 
played a role in the effort to establish Trianon as a lieu de memoire, the decision to incorporate the 
commemoration of Trianon into the state's official memory-politics was clearly motivated by the 
desire to rob an emergent political contender of a powerful mobilizational tool. 
 
Glory and anomie: historical nostalgia as remedy for disempowerment 
In the last section I will address the discursive appropriation of the symbol of Trianon and the socially 
relevant meanings associated with it. According an opinion poll conducted in 2003 (and repeated in 
2007 with similar results), only 10% of Hungarians thought that the partition of the country in 1920 
was the consequence of the politics that the Hungarian state had adopted in relation to ethnic 
minorities, while 30% expressed the opinion that the blame should be placed on “the Jews,” “the 
Left” and foreign powers (first of all France). Another poll highlighted the persistent relevance of 
Trianon. In 2007, half of respondents (twice as much as four years earlier) declared that “they cannot 
bow to Trianon,” meaning that they did not accept the consequences of the Trianon Treaty. 
(Vásárhelyi, 2007)    
Within the framework of a recent study that sought to examine the political attitudes and national 
identity of young Hungarians, I myself had the chance to talk to members of local Jobbik organizations 
who were involved in the organization of Trianon commemorations in the period of 2009-2013 
(Anonymus 2014). One of my interviewees who was active in the local Jobbik group in Dunaújváros, 
portrayed the Trianon commemorations as manifestations of community action and as occasions for 
the public expression of national identity. The leading role played by Jobbik in the organization of 
such events and in the mobilization of youth for community-related activities was also recognized by 
interviewees who were not members of Jobbik. 
Among young interviewees there was a consensus that the treaty, which “forced Hungary to give up 
two-thirds of its former territory,” constitutes a “national tragedy.” In the words of one participant: 
“This was a gigantic nation, and they cut its legs and arms. They left a small piece in the middle to show that there was 
once such a thing-” The grief caused by this loss is particular in that it possesses significant mobilizational 
power. Its discussion triggers indignation, hatred, revenge and revolt – emotional responses that can 
consequently be channelled into hostility towards the nation’s enemies and symbolic action aimed at 
redressing the injustice. Such action is oriented towards the symbolic reconstruction of pre-Trianon 
Hungary (“Greater-Hungary”), which is portrayed as the natural manifestation of the Hungarian 
nation’s economic, cultural, moral and political supremacy over inferior neighbours.  
“Greater Hungary” is not only perceived as the mirror-opposite of contemporary “smaller Hungary” 
but as a potential rallying 'site' for national solidarity: “Everyone knows somewhere deep inside that Greater 
Hungary was a good thing. That there is this is small, puny country in Central Europe and that that’s no good, and 
that there was this Greater Hungary, which was a fine thing. So it has in a way become a symbol. That’s what has to 
be destroyed because it creates community. Jobbik would practically not exist if it wasn’t for this. If there hadn’t been 
Trianon then there may not have been the kind of patriotic self-defence reflex that we saw in the 1920s. Things would 
look very different then; Jobbik may not exist at all.” This mobilizational potential is exploited in vernacular 
objectifications of the Trianon-cult such as the car stickers depicting the icon of “Greater Hungary”. 
An online debate conducted in 2010 revealed that the most frequently articulated arguments in support 
of the stickers' use was that they express solidarity towards Hungarians living in neighboring countries 
and that by putting them on public display one can contribute to the promotion of “historical truth”, 
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a kind of everyday memory-politics: “This sticker depicts the old and complete Hungary. If they would teach us 
the true history, then everyone would know just how our neighbors managed get hold of certain parts of our dear homeland. 
Throughout the thousand years of Hungarian history, our kings have always considered the entirety of the Carpathian 
Basin as being one country (which was dedicated to the Blessed Virgin Mary, Patron of Hungary). If someone uses this 
sticker, all they are doing is giving voice to historical truth.”xvii 
The online debate referred to above was triggered in 2010 by an article of a well-known historian who 
currently leads the largest scientific investigation on the memory of Trianon,xviii Balázs Ablonczy, 
which was published on the online news portal Origo.hu under the title “Historical Hungary: the sticker 
of memory.” According to Ablonczy: “The loss of these territories—and a sizeable Hungarian population with 
them—was a historical event that, even today, fills many people with sadness and nostalgia. The enthralment with lost 
greatness is at the same time an opium and a form of rebellion against conformity … Those who display the sticker 
simply want a reminder of the empire. (…) [The sticker] relates to official memory as graffiti relates to canonized art. 
Yet, in contrast to graffiti, it only appears on one’s own property and can always be removed. It is very much like a 
removable I Love You tattoo.” In Ablonczy’s view, this manifestation of historical nostalgia does not exist 
in itself, but is part of an everyday identity (or popular identity politics) which aims to create an object 
of national pride, that is, a symbol which can redress a battered self-esteem: “They are only trying to 
demonstrate their affiliations within a society which, in their view, is disintegrating. They want to leave a mark and to 
find community. The use of the stickers cannot be prohibited, and it would not be advisable to do so: those pieces of paper 
are the signs of social anomie—representing a diversity of emotions, not threats.” 
Our interviews and the online discussion both highlight the importance of remembering the “Trianon 
disaster” as well as its direct association with the cultivation of “Hungarianness”. Trianon offers an 
avenue for reasserting personal dignity in a situation of disempowerment. This was brought home to 
us by the frequent mentioning of “pride”, which our interviewees (as well as the participants of the 
online debate) described as something that they could achieve by: learning and teaching Hungarian 
history; participating in (or in some cases organizing) commemorative events; wearing or displaying 
“ancient” and once repressed historical symbols (the map of “Greater Hungary” or the Árpád-striped 
flag); or listening to a new type of “national rock music” disseminated by an emergent cultural industry. 
I am convinced that neither historical nostalgia nor new forms of everyday nationalism can be 
understood independently from the socio-political context in which they emerge. Referring to the 
work of Clifford Geertz, several scholars have identified the nation as a narration, “a story which 
people tell about themselves in order to lend meaning to their social world.” (Ram, 1994 referring the 
Geertz, here Wodak 1999, 23) It is, however, not only meaning that is at stake. Researchers who have 
attempted to uncover the structural drivers underpinning support for new forms of identity and 
memory-politics have argued that the success of new right-wing cultural and political entrepreneurs 
would not have been possible without the presence of economic grievances that compel those who 
experience them to confront the ideological status quo and its defenders (Kalb, 2011). The narratives 
of our interviewees also highlighted problems such as the disadvantaged position of labour vis-à-vis 
capital, the presence of unjustified social inequalities and the state’s inability to challenge these - 
suggesting that these play a role in the emergence of neo-nationalist and anti-elitist sensibilities. The 
analytical focus on issues of collective memory does not diminish (even less refute) the importance of 
socio-economic factors. Claiming that neo-nationalism is to a large extent driven by a profoundly 
“frustrated national identity” is not equal to saying that economic matters are irrelevant or secondary. 
To the contrary: frustrations related to “smaller Hungary” contain both cultural and economic aspects 
– shaped, amongst others, by the disintegration of perspectives for social mobility and sticking 





This paper started out by recognizing the valuable insights offered by previous researchers who have 
pointed to the significant role played by memory-politics in post-communist countries. Alongside 
Ange and Berdahl, Gyáni, Hann, Todorova and Gille I have also argued —through a focus on the 
rehabilitation of the memory of “Greater Hungary” and “Trianon” in the 2000s—that issues of 
memory have recently re-emerged as a central focus of public culture. The analysis I presented can be 
read also as a follow-up to an article published by ethnologist Tamás Hofer in 1992 in which – taking 
cue from Bourdieu – he analyzed the social functions and embeddedness of symbolic politics (Hofer, 
1992). With his analysis in mind I claim that the struggle between emergent elite groups after the 
change of regime for control over historical symbols and memory was not a unique event. The recent 
return of the iconography and discourse of revisionism to the public realm suggests that Hungarian 
society turns to historical symbols in situations of uncertainty. Furthermore, it also demonstrates that 
when a new generation of politicians sets out to define its position within the Hungarian political 
arena, it too chooses historical symbols to achieve its goals. 
While elite groups played a key role in the establishment of the iconography and memory-politics of 
the new democratic regime, my analysis highlighted radical right-wing organizations' effort to 
construct novel lieux de memoire and a counter-hegemonic memory-politics. This effort was centered 
on the resurrection of the Trianon-trauma through local commemorations of the anniversary of the 
Trianon Treaty, which had been banned under the state socialist period and continued to be neglected 
by left-liberal elites after the 'change of regime'. I argued that this strategy was greatly helped by popular 
forms of memory-politics – ranging from the publication of semi-professional historical periodicals 
to the creation of historical memory sites. These played an important role in the rehabilitation of a 
historically loaded symbolic tool kit, which enabled Trianon to become the 'mythomoteur' of 
Hungarian neo-nationalism. They achieved this by expelling professional historiography and creating 
space for a historicizing identity politics. The latter was enacted by – typically young – activists 
associated with the Jobbik party and revisionist movements who began to organize commemorative 
events in local communities from the beginning of the past decade. Their success in attracting 
sympathy and a growing number of followers was not only enabled by the proponents of public history 
but also increasing frustration – gripping wide segments of society – with the project of regime change 
and the elites who steered the country through the period of transition. The invention of this old-new 
political tradition could only have a powerful social effect because it was broadcast “on a wavelength 
to which the public was ready to tune in” (Hobsbawm, 1987: 263). The Trianon-cult in Hungary 
addressed a widespread need for collective self-esteem and personal pride by providing adherents the 
opportunity to express grievances, channelling grievance into anger against elite groups and offering 
an avenue for overcoming personal and collective trauma through the symbolic assertion of national 
unity and superiority. 
The success of 'Trianonization' is most clearly evidenced in the reaction it elicited from the mainstream 
right. Recognizing the power of the discourse and associated symbols, the right-wing governments 
since 2010 entrenched the commemoration of the 'national tragedy' as a key element of the state's 
memory-politics.xix Although state-sponsored rituals have sought to domesticate a countercultural 
movement, the narratives focusing on the Trianon-trauma retain a subversive – not to say explosive 
– potential. This is because as a mythomoteur for present-day Hungarian nationalism the Trianon-cult 
has set in motion a novel kind of nation-building process. Trianon clearly constitutes a watershed 
between the political and the ethnic conceptions of nationhood. The example of the renewed Trianon-
cult shows that radical shifts in politics – in this case, the shift from a presentist republican to a 
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historicist ethnic conception of the nation – takes place through the activation of a previously 
suppressed symbolic repertoire that bears the imprints of its previous uses.  
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